A robot or device acts on a command only if it is one someone approved.

Last updated: 15 November 2026
Design stage. Everything on this page is a design, applying the SPT‑Txn check to robots, automated vehicles and connected devices. It is not built, not demonstrated and not tested on any robot or device. We publish it to invite review from robotics and device builders.

Robot fleets and connected devices usually check who is connected and which channel they may use. They do not check what the command says, or whether a person approved it. A stolen credential, a compromised fleet manager or a planning agent acting on a poisoned instruction can send a well‑formed command that nobody approved.

The gap

The design: command authorization at the edge

Streamed or continuous control, such as live teleoperation, is a harder case and is not covered by this first design.

Safety comes first

The gate is never a safety function and never sits in a safety loop. Emergency stops, protective stops, bumpers, scanners and every other protection stay exactly as they are and never depend on it. If an approval expires while a robot is moving, the gate stops accepting new orders and records it; what the robot does next is decided by the operator’s own safety assessment, not by SPT‑Txn.

What it would not stop

Physical tampering, sensor spoofing and a compromised robot controller are outside what a command check can fix. Neither does it judge whether an approved order was wise; it records who approved it.

If this is useful to you

We are looking for robot and device builders, fleet operators and researchers to review the design and help build a first simulated demonstration.

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rudi@violetskysecurity.com