A drone accepts a command only if it fits the mission someone approved.

Last updated: 15 November 2026
Design stage. Everything on this page is a design, applying the SPT‑Txn check to drone commands. It is not built, not demonstrated and not tested on any aircraft. We publish it to invite review from operators and researchers.

Drone command links prove that a message came from someone holding the key. They do not prove that the command is one a person actually approved. If a ground station is compromised, it sends whatever an attacker wants, with a valid key.

The gap

The design: mission command authorization

Safety comes first

The gate never sits in the flight‑control loop and is never a safety function. Commands that move the aircraft to a safer state (hold, return to launch, land) are never blocked, and a refusal never cuts power. The trade‑off is stated plainly: because these commands are not blocked, someone holding a stolen link key could still force a landing or a return. Link encryption or signing still protects the radio link; SPT‑Txn answers a different question: was this command approved?

What it would not stop

Jamming, GPS or sensor spoofing, and a compromised autopilot or companion computer are outside what a command check can fix. Neither does it judge whether an approved mission was wise; it records who approved it.

If this is useful to you

We are looking for drone operators, autopilot developers and researchers to review the design and help build a first simulated demonstration.

The same check for plants and machines →
The same check for robots and IoT (design) →
How the token chain works →
rudi@violetskysecurity.com