Independent digital‑asset verification and security assessment.
A token’s name, symbol and logo establish nothing. They are strings an issuer chose. ACV answers a narrower and more useful question: is this contract the asset you think it is, and what can whoever controls it still do to you?
ACV is Violet Sky Security’s digital‑asset verification service for exchanges, custodians, financial institutions and real‑world‑asset infrastructure. It resolves asset identity on‑chain, evaluates security‑relevant properties (issuer controls, contract privileges, upgradeability, transfer restrictions) and issues a cryptographically signed verdict with the evidence attached, so the recipient can re‑check the conclusion rather than take our word for it.
The two are independent. ACV is a commercial subscription product, licensed separately; it is not a component of the SPT‑Txn open‑source framework and is not covered by its Apache‑2.0 licence. It is independently deployable and does not require SPT‑Txn.
The problem
Two contracts can present the same name, the same symbol and the same decimals. Only one of them is the asset your desk thinks it is trading. Identity is the first problem, and it is the easy one.
The harder problem is that identity is not a permanent property. A contract that was safe at listing can change afterwards. An upgrade authority can be transferred. A pause, freeze or blacklist capability can be introduced or exercised. An issuer can acquire control over transfers it did not previously have. A one‑time smart‑contract audit describes a snapshot; it does not tell an operator that the snapshot stopped being true last Tuesday.
What ACV verifies
- Identity. That the contract or token reference resolves to the asset claimed, on the chain claimed, with the metadata claimed.
- Safety and privilege. What the contract permits its privileged roles to do: upgradeability, admin and owner powers, pause, freeze, mint and burn authority.
- Transfer restrictions. Whether transfers are permissioned, and by what mechanism.
- Distribution and liquidity. Supply and holder structure as the chain reports it.
- Liveness. Whether the asset and its data sources are currently reachable, current and self‑consistent.
- Declared backing. What the issuer asserts, and where. Recorded as a claim, never as a verified fact.
Evidence and assurance
Every assessment is a signed artifact, not a dashboard reading. A verdict carries the evidence it was derived from, the sources it was derived from, and the time it was derived, so a counterparty, an auditor or a regulator can re‑run the check and disagree with the conclusion on the merits.
Verdicts are graded, and a missing answer is not a pass
ACV distinguishes this is fine from this needs a human from we could not establish this to the standard required. That distinction is the product. A verification service that returns a pass when it cannot see clearly is worse than no service at all, because it launders uncertainty into confidence.
Fail‑closed, by construction
- A source that is stale, inconsistent or unverifiable fails closed. It never resolves to a pass.
- The signed asset registry carries an explicit lifetime. After expiry ACV holds rather than serving an answer it can no longer stand behind.
- Registry versions are rollback‑refusing: an older version is never accepted over a newer one.
- Where a chain family’s data sources cannot yet be shown to be independently fresh and consistent, verdicts for that family are capped below PASS by policy. A deliberate ceiling, not an undetected gap.
Institutional use cases
- Listing and asset onboarding. Establish identity and privilege exposure before an asset is admitted, with an artifact that survives the decision.
- Custody and treasury. Know what the issuer of a held asset can still do to it.
- OTC and swaps. Confirm the instrument on both sides of a trade is the instrument named.
- RWA infrastructure. Re‑assessment across a tokenized asset’s lifecycle rather than a single audit at issuance. Upgrade authorities move, control is acquired, and evidence goes stale after the certificate is framed. Each re‑assessment is its own signed artifact, so the record shows what changed and when it was last established.
- Per‑asset due diligence duties. Where a licence obliges a firm to assess each asset it handles, ACV produces the record of that assessment in a form a supervisor can check.
Current status
Stated plainly, because the difference between what runs and what is planned is the thing a technical reader most needs and most often cannot get.
| Capability | Status |
|---|---|
| EVM verification (Ethereum, Base) | Implemented |
| Signed verdicts and evidence artifacts | Implemented |
| Signed asset registry, versioned and expiring | Implemented |
| Further EVM networks | Short‑dated; the adapter pattern is shared |
| Hedera | Implemented, capped below PASS pending verified source assurance |
| Solana | Specified and hostile‑reviewed; implementation in progress |
| Algorand, XRPL | Researched; not built |
Commercial model
ACV is an enterprise digital‑asset verification and security assessment platform, available independently or as an optional integration with SPT‑Txn. Contact Violet Sky Security to discuss institutional use cases and commercial access.
This is a deliberate departure from SPT‑Txn, and worth being precise about so nobody infers the wrong thing from the rest of this site. SPT‑Txn’s verifier, decision core, adapters and token formats are open source under Apache‑2.0 and always will be; what is paid there is operating a fleet of enforcement points and proving compliance with them. ACV is not part of that open‑source boundary. It is independently licensed, commercially, and its verification service is not free.
Engagements run as self‑hosted evaluation under NDA, shadow mode first: ACV renders verdicts alongside an existing process without gating anything, so a prospective operator can see what it would have refused before anything depends on it.
Two independent products, one complementary trust model
ACV establishes evidence about the asset. SPT‑Txn determines whether a transaction is authorized. Each is useful on its own and neither requires the other.
The integration is a condition, not a pipeline. An institution can run ACV with no SPT‑Txn deployment at all, or run SPT‑Txn against its own policy with no ACV. Where both are deployed, an authorization can be made to depend on a current, signed assessment of the asset being moved, and each half stays independently verifiable.